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Abstract
Korea’s banking industry underwent incredible growth in the last 50 years and the role of 
corporate governance has become ever more important. It is now generally accepted that 
corporate governance is essential for a healthier and stronger banking industry. This is 
especially relevant because banks directly affect the stability of Korea’s financial market and the 
development of its national economy. Reforming the corporate governance of Korean banks can 
therefore help prevent financial crises in the future. 
This paper provides an overview of Korea’s economy and banking industry, and explains 
their relationships with corporate governance. While there are different aspects to corporate 
governance of banks, this paper focuses on risk management because it plays a crucial role. This 
paper concludes by making several recommendations for a more effective risk management 
system to promote healthier Korean banks.
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I. Introduction
Poor corporate governance often plays a key contributing role in 
financial crises. Corporate governance and fiduciary duty of directors are 
important for all organizations, but especially for banks because they 
directly affect the stability of financial markets and national economies. 
Banks have many aspects that involve more risk-taking than general 
companies, thus requiring more closely watched corporate governance.1) 
For example, balance sheets of banks are structured in a way that causes 
assets and liabilities to be mismatched in terms of maturity, thereby making 
long-term assets difficult to liquidate. This makes banks vulnerable to 
liquidity shocks that are often systematic in nature.2)  
Also, banks manage projects that disproportionately affect entire 
economies3) and do not require special equipment or facilities, which 
expedites their globalization process as long as they have access to 
information.4) This means that banks’ effects are also world-wide. This is 
why governmental regulations are generally most strict and international 
for the finance industry, and more specifically, the banking industry.5) The 
momentous effects of banks are noted by the Korean Supreme Court, which 
had ruled that bank directors must fulfill their fiduciary duties with utmost 
care, including their duty for providing proper risk management.6)  
It cannot be said that poor corporate governance of financial institutions 
alone leads to financial crises; research analyzing corporate governance of 
37 companies that were excluded from the S&P 500 during the 2008 
financial crisis illustrates that poor corporate governance was not the sole 
1) Peter O. Mulbert & Ryan D. Citlau, The Uncertain Role of Banks’ Corporate Governance in 
Systematic Risk Regulation 10 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 179/2011, 
2011).  
2) Id. at 11.   
3) Id. at 12.  
4) Hwa-Jin Kim, Corporate Governance of Banks and Bank Director Liability, seoul l. J. 151, 
166 (2010) (S. Korea).  
5) Id. 
6) Supreme Court, 2000Da9086, Mar. 15, 2002 (S. Kor.).
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contributor.7) But it is now widely accepted and nearly undisputed that it 
played a key contributing role. Many financial institutions that were hit 
hard with the financial crisis had abnormal manager compensation system8) 
and improperly functioning boards that led to greater risks.9) Also, a large 
portion of policymaking problems involved board remuneration, which 
promoted greater and inefficient risk-taking.10) Many banks had complex 
and opaque bank structures,11) as well as perverse incentives that focused 
on short-term revenues while taking on high long-term risks, which all 
contributed to the crisis.12)  
After the 2008 global financial crisis, many reforms have been proposed 
worldwide to counter deficiencies, including clearer separation of 
management and control functions, greater transparency with the bank 
structure, and group-wide corporate governance in single entities. Many 
experts agree that the lack of proper corporate governance with respect to 
risk-taking was one of the most significant causes to the banking crisis.13) 
While there are other areas of improvement, risk management reforms can 
have directly effective results. It can improve corporate value of banks, 
prevent systematic risk of care,14) and help prevent financial crises. Since 
Korean banks are subject to poor risk management, this paper proposes 
strengthening their risk management as central corporate governance 
reform for Korea’s financial industry.
7) Kim, supra note 4, at 166. 
8) Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market 
Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 Bus. laW. 1 (2009). 
9) James R. Booth et al., Boards of Directors, Ownership, and Regulation, 26 J. of BanKing & 
fin. 1973 (2002).
10) Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 geo. l.J. 247 (2009). 
11) Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis 11, 12 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 181/2011, 2011).
12) Id. at 12. 
13) See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Principles for 
Enhancing Corporate Governance, Bank Int’l Settlements, 6-7 (Mar. 2010), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs168.pdf. 
14) Kim, supra note 4, at 180. 
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II. The Korean Banking Industry
The banking industry of South Korea has evolved during the last 50 
years of dramatic changes in the Korean economy. The economic reform 
led by President Chung Hee Park in 1961 stimulated export-centric growth 
where exporting firms were granted favors such as low interest loans 
according to their export performance.15) Under Park’s leadership, the 
government carried out a currency reform, strengthened financial 
institutions, and introduced flexible economic planning.16) The government 
also emphasized labor-intensive light industries to promote rapid debt-
financed industrial expansion. 
In 1970s, Korea directed fiscal and financial policies toward promoting 
heavy and chemical industries, consumer electronics, and automobiles. 
Manufacturing continued to grow rapidly in many different industrial 
sectors in 1980s and early 1990s.17) Korea consequently achieved one of the 
world’s fastest growth rate from early 1960s to late 1990s; its real gross 
domestic product (GDP) increased by an average of more than eight 
percent per year, from US$ 2.7 billion in 1962 to US$ 230 billion in 1989.18) 
This economic development is now commonly referred to as the “Miracle 
of Han River.”
Growth of the Korean banking industry paralleled that of Korea’s 
economic development. The country witnessed an average growth of 21.9 
percent in total assets of commercial banks from 1989 to 1998.19) The banks’ 
role in attracting savings and distributing the resulting funds also increased 
15) Myung-Soo Cha, The Economic History of Korea, eH.net encyclopedia (Feb. 2, 2010, 
6:21PM), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/cha.korea. 
16) Id. 
17) Background Note: South Korea, u.s. department of state (Apr. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm. 
18) South Korea GDP Growth Rate, trading economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.
com/south-korea/gdp-growth. 
19) Un-Chan Chung, Jee-Man Jung, Shee-Chang Ham & Gyu-Han Kim, Economies of Scale 
and Scope in Korea’s Banking Industry: Evidence from the Fourier Flexible Form, tHe J. of tHe 
Korean econ. 87, 89 (2001). 
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as the economy grew.20) This allowed the banking industry to grow faster 
than the rest of the economy. While there were only eight Korean banks in 
the world’s 500 largest banks in terms of paid-in capital in 1983, this 
number increased to 18 by 1996.21) But this rapid growth was challenged by 
the Korean financial crisis of 1997 (“the 1997 Crisis”), which compelled 
major corporate governance reforms and thereafter changed the behavior of 
Korean banks. 
1. Leading up to the 1997 Crisis
The rapid growth of the Korean banking industry came with side 
effects, avalanching into the 1997 Crisis that occurred shortly after Korea’s 
financial liberalization and market opening in early 1990s.22) Years of 
concentrated growth had destabilized Korea’s financial system and greatly 
contributed to the crisis.23) Also, government-led development strategies 
over the decades preceding the financial liberalization had involved routine 
government intervention in the financial sector, which prevented market 
discipline from ever taking root;24) extensive government involvement in 
the internal management weakened the autonomy and accountability of the 
banks’ management.25)  
All this steered the banks to focus on attracting savings, which 
prevented proper development of expertise in screening and monitoring 
loans,26) and the banks consequently lacked the ability to assess the 
profitability and credit risks of firms.27) Overall, Korean banks substantially 
lagged behind their western counterparts in terms of staff training, skills, 
20) Id. 
21) Id. at 90. 
22) Hyung-Gon Ro, Banking Industry Consolidation in Korea 93 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, 
Working Paper No. 4), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap04i.pdf.   
23) Id.   
24) Jae-Ha Park, Corporate Governance of Banks in Republic of Korea, in 1 corporate 
governance of BanKs in asia 167, 167 (Sang-Woo Nam & Chee-Soon Lum, ed., 2006).
25) Id. at 168.  
26) Chung, Jung, Ham & Kim, supra note 19.  
27) Id. 
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and experience,28) which prevented them from exploiting financial 
derivatives and newly advanced financial technology.29) These problems 
were aggravated by the strict segmentation of the financial industry and 
high entry barriers that limited the initiative and innovation of banks. 
Korean banks were thus simply not ready for the financial liberalization 
that accelerated in the early 1990s when the government lifted various 
restrictions on asset and liability management of financial institutions and 
encouraged changes in the existing institutional framework.30)
These changes increased short-term foreign currency debts held by 
domestic financial institutions. Banks started to dramatically increase new 
lending without appropriate credit-risk evaluation that went unchecked 
because of the inefficient use of the financial supervisory system in Korea.31) 
All this ultimately brought on the 1997 Crisis where a string of large 
corporate insolvencies and rapid build-up of bad loans held by financial 
institutions threatened Korea’s financial system.32) 
2. During & After the 1997 Crisis
During the 1997 Crisis, Korea lacked foreign currency liquidity to meet 
its maturing liabilities, which followed a drastic decrease in its foreign 
exchange reserves.33) Several securities companies, 14 merchant banks, and 
one investment trust company were shut down as a result.34) The currency 
crisis quickly escalated into financial and economic crises with the 
continued loss of confidence of foreign investors. With the exodus of 
foreign capital and a sharp contraction in corporate investment and 
consumer spending, the value of the Korean currency (Korean won) fell by 
more than 50 percent, and Korea’s real GDP contracted by six percent in 
28) Chung, Jung, Ham & Kim, supra note 19, at 90.  
29) Id. 
30) Park, supra note 24, at 168.  
31) Id.  
32) Ro, supra note 22, at 93. 
33) Id. 
34) Financial Services Commission, http://www.fsc.go.kr (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
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1998.35) The surge in corporate bankruptcies also increased unemployment 
rate to over eight percent by the end of 1998 from less than three percent in 
1997.36) Banks were hit especially hard. Bonds issued by one of Korea’s 
biggest banks were trading at 60 percent of face value in December 1997, 
down from 100 percent of face value in October 1997.37) Furthermore, the 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) capital ratio, a globally accepted 
indicator of banks’ healthiness, dropped to 7.0 percent in 1997, 38) which is 
well below the requested minimum of 8 percent. 39)  
In panic, the Korean government turned to International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for standby credit, which responded by signing an emergency 
package of US$ 58.4 billion on December 3, 1997. The emergency rescue 
plan required Korea to launch structural reforms in the financial sector, 
corporate sector, and labor market, along with sound management of 
macroeconomic policy.40) This program was led by President Dae-jung Kim, 
which helped Korea quickly return to growth rates of ten percent in 1999 
and nine percent in 2000.41) Korea swiftly recovered, allowing an early 
repayment of the loan from the IMF rescue package,42) which is further 
evidenced by its BIS ratio improving to 13.1 percent in 2006. 43)  
The structural reforms prompted substantial changes in the structure 
and behavior of banks.44) By the end of 1997, each of the ten largest Korean 
banks (based on assets) had undergone consolidation.45) Eight of the ten 
35) See Ja-Hyeong Koo & Sherry L. Kaiser, Recovery from a Financial Crisis: The Case of 
Korea, econ & fin. rev., 4th Q. 2001, at 24, 27. 
36) Id. at 30-31. 
37) John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF and the United 
States, 7 Kan. J.l. & puB. pol’y 70, 70 (1998). 
38) Bang-Nam Jeon, From the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis to the 2008-09 Global Economic 
Crisis: Lessons from Korea’s Experience, 5 e. asia l. rev. 103, 121.
39) See sHuKan toH-yo Keizai, WHy BanKs made Big mistaKes? 30-34 (1998). 
40) Jeon, supra note 38, at 105. 
41) Background Note: South Korea, supra note 18.  
42) Jeon, supra note 38, at 107.  
43) Id. at 121.  
44) Soo-Myung Kim, Ji-Young Kim & Hoon-Tae Ryoo, Restructuring and Reforms in the 
Korean Banking Industry 259-268 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 28), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap28q.pdf.   
45) Jong-Moo Choi & Michael Papaioannou, Financial Crisis and Risk Management: 
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largest banks either merged or acquired smaller banks to produce the three 
largest and presumably more competitive banks.46) These banks focused 
more on profitability and competitiveness and began assuming a greater 
role as comprehensive asset managers.47) Consequently, the Korean banking 
industry started to demonstrate stronger performance with enhanced 
profitability, asset soundness, and capital adequacy.48) They also made 
considerable headway in enhancing their efficiency and resilience. And 
while the 2008 global financial crisis hurt the banking industry worldwide 
and reduced the net income of Korean banks in 2009 to 6.9 trillion won, 
Korean banks recovered relatively quickly to their previous levels and have 
since remained in positive territory.49) All this illustrate the extent of 
positive impact of effective corporate governance on banks and the national 
economy. 
III. Corporate Governance of Banks
Before the 1997 Crisis, ‘bankruptcy of banks’ had been viewed as 
unrealistic and mergers of banks as something that only occurred in other 
countries.50) General consensus in Korea had been that banks did not have 
to strive in maintaining their sustainability.51) However, the aftermath of the 
1997 Crisis showed that bank bankruptcies and mergers were very real 
possibilities in Korea.52) Since then, corporate governance of banks and legal 
liability of bank directors started being treated like that of general 
Reassessing the Asian Financial Crisis in Light of the American Financial Crisis, 5 e. asia l. rev. 
442, 449 (2010).  
46) Id.
47) Kim, Kim & Ryoo, supra note 44.  
48) Korea’s Banking Industry Today, Korea Federation of Banks, available at www.kfb.or.kr/
eng/industry/kotoday.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
49) Id. 
50) Kim, supra note 4, at 165.   
51) Id.  
52) Hwa-Jin Kim, Taking International Soft Law Seriously: Its Implications for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance, 1 J. of Korean l. 1, 11-33 (2001) (S. Korea).   
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companies.53) And management boards of shaky financial institutions 
during the 1997 Crisis had to face civil and criminal liabilities54); for 
example, directors of Korea First Bank (now Standard Chartered Korea 
First Bank Limited) were ordered to pay huge damages to its shareholders. 
1. Agreement with the IMF
The 1997 Crisis led the Korean banks to install and effectuate the true 
meaning of corporate governance. Paragraph 4 of the Letter of Intent Korea 
signed with the IMF acknowledges the need for a comprehensive policy 
package to improve corporate governance as part of the ‘Memorandum on 
the Economic Program,’ an attachment to the Letter of Intent. The 
Memorandum has four broad paragraphs under the heading “corporate 
governance and corporate structure.” It states “transparency of corporate 
balance sheets… will be improved by enforcing accounting standards in 
line with generally accepted accounting practices, including thorough 
independent external audits, full disclosure, and provision of consolidated 
statements for business conglomerates.”55) 
In 1998, Korea executed another Letter of Intent with a new 
‘Memorandum on the Economic Program,’ which has a section on 
‘Corporate Governance and Restructuring.’56) The section lists four specific 
objectives- transparency, accountability to shareholders, corporate 
restructuring, and bankruptcy procedures.57) The Memorandum provides 
that “the commercial orientation of bank lending will be fully respected 
and the government will not intervene in bank management and lending 
decisions.”58) It further states that directed lending shall be immediately 
eliminated and that the Korean government shall formulate a plan “to 
encourage the restructuring of corporate finances, including measures to 
53) Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and 
Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BerKeley J. int’l l. 61, 81-85 (1999). 
54) Kim, supra note 4, at 165. 
55) Young-Cheol David K. Jeong, Charting Corporate and Financial Governance in Korea in 
the New Decade, 2 Jindal gloBal l. rev. 99, 99 (2011).  
56) Id. at 100.  
57) Id. 
58) Kim, supra note 52, at 70. 
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reduce the high debt-to-equity ratio of corporations, develop capital 
markets to reduce the share of bank financing by corporations, and change 
the system of cross guarantees within conglomerates.”59) Under such 
guidance, the Korean government implemented the long-needed, sweeping 
reforms. 
2. Corporate Governance Reforms
After signing the Memorandum, the Korean government promptly 
executed a wide range of amendments to the laws and regulations relating 
to corporate governance. In particular, the government amended the 
Korean Securities and Exchange Act (“KSEA”) and the Korean Commercial 
Code (“KCC”) to reflect the changed circumstances in the capital markets 
and the Korean firms’ new pattern of doing business and methods of 
financing.60) The government also introduced provisions to protect 
unsophisticated investors under the changed regulatory environment.61) 
Furthermore, financial reform bills were introduced to improve prudential 
regulations and accelerate capital market liberalization.62) They included 
bills to correct the built-in inefficiency of the financial market by improving 
independence of the central bank, which was achieved with the neutral 
consolidated Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC).63) This implied a 
shift from a financial policy-making structure dominated by Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (MOFE) to a decentralized structure with better 
checks and balances.64) 
The Korean government also pursued important legal and institutional 
reforms.65) To limit the risks inherent in concentrated lending, the Korean 
government imposed a cap—amounting to a maximum of 25 percent of 
59) Id. 
60) Jeong, supra note 55, at 101. 
61) Kim, supra note 52, at 70.  
62) Park, supra note 24, at 169.  
63) Id.  
64) Id. 
65) Id. 
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bank equity capital—on lending to any one borrower and its affiliates.66) In 
order to combat the lack of transparency that was a common feature of pre-
crisis Korea, the government enacted “Real Name Financial Transactions 
and Guarantee of Secrecy Act” in December 1997, requiring banks to record 
the real names of their clients.67) This greatly supplemented the Emergency 
Presidential Order Regarding Real Name Financial Transactions and the 
Protection of Confidentiality that was issued in August 1993 to protect 
financial institutions against frauds stemming from the use of false names.68) 
A new board governance system was assembled and launched in the 
Korean banking sector in response to pressing concerns over the viability of 
major Korean banks. Prior to the 1997 Crisis, Korean corporate boards were 
nominal organizations under the direct control of controlling shareholders 
in most cases. The boards were regularly comprised of officer-directors 
without the participation of outside, independent directors. The role of the 
board in corporate governance had therefore been minimal.69) But under the 
supervision of the FSC, Korean banks were required to establish a board 
governance system that satisfied the global standard with outside-majority 
boards and a committee structure; listed companies were required to have a 
board with a ratio of three officer-directors to one outside director. 70) The 
Korean Banking Act also introduced a system under which non-officer 
directors had to hold the majority position on corporate boards.71) 
Consequently, the proportion of outside directors in the new boards 
increased to 60-80 percent.72) 
The Korean banks also adopted the functions of various committees 
such as a governance committee, an audit committee, a management 
development and compensation committee, and a risk management 
committee, all under the supervision of board of directors. These efforts 
66) John W. Head, The Asian Financial Crisis in Retrospect- Observations on Legal and 
Institutional Lessons Learned After a Dozen Years, 5 e. asia l. rev. 31, 60 (2010). 
67) Id. 
68) The Emergency Presidential Order Regarding Real Name Financial Transactions and 
the Protection of Confidentiality, No. 16 (1993) (S. Kor.). 
69) Kim, supra note 52, at 74.  
70) Id.  
71) Id.  
72) Park, supra note 24, at 169. 
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allowed the Korean banks to improve their soundness and profitability 
more quickly than expected.73) Further, the enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in the U.S. on July 30, 2002 rekindled the reformative movement 
for advancing governance structures in Korea.74) (For example, the 
movement resulted in requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify financial 
statements.)75) 
As a result, the board of directors system has functioned much more 
effectively since the 1997 Crisis. And top management of commercial banks 
continued to enhance the transparency of bank management in maintaining 
bank soundness.76) Corporate governance of banks and legal liability of 
bank directors now receive greater attention and are more heavily 
regulated than that of general companies. Unlike pre-1997 Crisis times, 
terms such as “corporate governance risks” and “CEO risks” of banks are 
now widely used in Korea.77) Despite these changes, Korea underwent 
financial crises again in 2003 and 2009. This shows that while corporate 
governance of banks is now taken more seriously by the Korean govern-
ment and banks, there is still room for improvement. And enhancing 
corporate governance requires more effective risk management;78) OECD 
specifically pointed to poor risk management as a leading factor in the 2008 
global financial crisis.79) Reforms that target effective risk management 
therefore need to be pursued to better safeguard against future financial 
crises. This is especially the case nowadays as many Korean banks are in a 
heated race to become a “mega-bank.”80) Birth of such mega-banks is the 
73) Id. at 170.  
74) Jeong, supra note 55, at 101.
75) David A. Skeel, Jr., Book Review: Governance in the Ruins: Law and Capitalism: What 
Corporate Crises Reveal About Legal Systems and Economic Development around the World, 122 
Harv. l. rev. 696, 707 (2008).  
76) Park, supra note 24, at 171. 
77) Kim, supra note 4, at 165. 
78) Id.
79) Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible Risk Management in Banking: The Corporate 
Governance Dimension, 36 del. J. corp. l. 121, 122 (2011).    
80) See Christian Oliver, South Korea’s mega-bank aspirations may soon be realized, financial 
times (Jun. 16, 2010, 11:18 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2010/06/16/south-koreas-
mega-bank-aspirations-may-soon-be-realised/#axzz2FNbwks66 (Pressure for a South Korean 
mega-bank mounted in 2009 when South Korea won a $20 billion deal to export nuclear 
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exact opposite of a new international trend after the latest financial crisis,81) 
and proper risk management would be especially important if such mega-
banks were to ever emerge in Korea. 
IV. Risk Management
Risk management is especially important in corporate governance as 
experts have identified poor risk management as one of the greatest 
contributing causes to financial crises. It is thus important to identify areas 
of weakness in risk management and improve them to promote a healthier 
banking industry in Korea. 
1. Importance of Better Risk Management
Effective risk management has become more important as risks faced by 
banks have increased in recent years. Financial markets have become more 
volatile, which exposed banks to greater fluctuations in interest rates and 
exchange rates. The process of deregulation in many countries have 
encouraged and permitted the banks to diversify into other business 
activities, which further increased greater risk-taking.82) This is why OECD 
identified poor risk management as a leading cause of the 2008 financial 
crisis.83)   
In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions 
of all sizes and types from all over the world were taking greater risks.84) 
There were more uses of leverage, on balance sheet and off, larger and 
reactors to the United Arab Emirates and was rankled as buyers insisted the financing be 
organized by a big foreign lender, Standard Chartered).
81) Sun-Young Lee, Mega bank in Korea: Good or bad?, Korea Herald (Jun. 18, 2010, 5:40 
PM), http://nwww.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20100618000820. 
82) The Importance of Risk Management, Hong Kong monetary autHority (Nov. 1995), 
http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/publication-and-research/quarterly-bulletin/
qb9511/sp06.pdf.
83) Murphy, supra note 79. 
84) William S. Haraf, Systemic Risk and the Response to the Crisis, 8 BerKeley Bus. l.J. 1, 1 
(2011).  
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more aggressively managed trading books, along with greater use of poorly 
understood structured products. These were joined with weaker liability 
structures, concentrations in riskier asset classes, and increased lending to 
weaker borrowers, both commercial and consumer.85)  
Big Wall Street institutions are good examples of excessive risk-taking. 
In the eight years from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2007, the assets 
of Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley 
together grew by 350 percent to about US$4 trillion.86) This illustrates how 
investment banks became huge principal investing and trading machines 
with balance sheets to match.87) And a fairly broad consensus had emerged 
around the world that creditors and counterparties of big financial 
institutions would always get repaid.88) Furthermore, market discipline, 
which operates as a check against excesses, had failed. Compensation 
practice and incentives for executives and traders encouraged the 
weakening of underwriting and credit standards in favor of promoting 
volume growth. This was worsened by banks’ underestimation of the 
liquidity risk in their funding models, due to the misperception of 
counterparty risk of complicated derivative instruments.89) All this 
promoted greater risk-taking, which ultimately led to the financial crisis in 
2008. 
Due to the extent of such negative impact of poor risk management, 
public policymakers around the world have since focused more on the role 
and profile of risk management in financial institutions. A study by Ellul 
and Yerranmilli in 2010 investigated whether strong and independent risk 
management is significantly related to bank risk-taking and performance 
by using a sample of 74 large U.S. bank holding companies.90) The study 
constructed a Risk Management Index (RMI) based on five variables related 
85) Id. 
86) Id.  
87) Id.  
88) Id. at 2.  
89) Choi, supra note 45, at 453.   
90) Vincent Aebi, Gabriele Sabato & Markus Schmid, Risk Management, Corporate 
Governance, and Bank Performance in the Financial Crisis (Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1942896. 
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to the strength of a bank’s risk management.91) Their findings indicate that 
banks with high RMI values in 2006 were less active in trading off-balance 
sheet derivatives, and had lower exposure to private-label mortgage-
backed securities, a smaller fraction of non-performing loans and lower 
downside risk, and a higher Sharpe Ratio during the crisis years 2007/ 
2008.92) In essence, the study showed that effective risk management makes 
banks significantly less vulnerable to financial crises. Corporate governance 
reforms with a greater emphasis on risk management are therefore crucial.
And this is especially important for Korean banks because they have 
become more globalized and susceptible to foreign influences. They are 
exposed to greater foreign currency liquidity risks because the Korean won 
is not accepted as a key currency.93) Moreover, since international trade 
plays an important role in Korea, foreign currency liquidity risk management 
is crucial for the soundness of Korean banks.94) Potential global financial 
turbulence and growing household debt are also reasons for Korean 
financial services to place greater priority on controlling risks.95)  
2. Legal Concept of Risk in Korea
Korean laws and model codes explicitly recognize the role of risks in 
banks. Article 1 of the Financial Holding Companies Act states that it 
promotes the establishment of financial holding companies and the 
prevention of risk transfers and excessive control.96) It also aims to promote 
sound management of financial holding companies and their subsidiaries, 
and to protect the rights of interested parties, so that competitiveness of the 
91) Id. 
92) Id. 
93) Korea Inst. of Fin., Regulation and Supervision for Sound Liquidity Risk Management for 
Banks (Feb. 2010),  www.aseansec.org/documents/ASEAN+3RG/0910/FR/17a.pdf. 
94) Id. 
95) You-Kyung Lee, S. Korean Banking Groups to Focus on Risk Management This Year, 
yonHap neWs agency (Jan. 2, 2012), English.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2012/01/02/85/050
3000000AEN20120102004500320F.HTML. 
96) Geumyung jiju hoesa beop [Financial Holding Companies Act], Act No. 10361, Jun. 8, 
2010, art. 1 (S. Kor.). 
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financial industry and the overall economy can be improved.97) Furthermore, 
Enforcement Decree of the Financial Investment Services and Capital 
Markets Act (“Capital Markets Act”) employs the term ‘risk’ in Article 31 in 
the context of internal control management.98) In Articles 30 and 31, 
regulations on supervising banking institutions state that banks are 
responsible for constructing a risk management system and establishing a 
risk management structure surrounding the board.99) 
The recently revised Code on Internal Group Control of Financial 
Holding Companies specifically mentions the concept of risk.100) Article 2 of 
this Code defines group internal control standard as a process that protects 
financial consumers by maintaining the integrity of financial subsidiary 
companies and preventing conflicts of interests, while abiding by the law 
and performing risk management.101) Title of Article 6 explicitly reads ‘Risk 
Management’ and states that (1) financial holding companies must 
establish risk management policies and standards for conducting asset 
management duties, and must also turn all risk into quantifiably measurable 
variables that are consistently recognized and evaluated; (2) financial 
holding companies must establish a risk management system capable of 
managing previously uncontrolled risk and a system capable of inspecting 
the suitability of the risk management system; and (3) risk management of 
financial holding companies must be performed in all work areas. A special 
department may be created for handling risk management.102) These 
illustrate that risk management is being actively introduced into Korea’s 
laws. But laws on risk management are still not sufficiently detailed and 
risk management practices in Korean banks have much room for 
improvement.
97) Id. 
98) Jabonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeobe gwanhan beobyul sihaengryeong [Enforcement 
Decree of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Presidential Decree No. 
22718, Mar. 22, 2011, art. 31 (S. Kor.).
99) Id. 
100) Code on Internal Group Control of Financial Holding Companies (S. Kor.).
101) Id.
102) Id.
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3. Risk Management at Korean Banks
Today, Korean banks’ risk management practices conform for the most 
part to internationally accepted standards under the current supervisory 
framework.103) And the overall risk management performance of Korean 
banks surveyed is relatively good. In the case of credit risk area, most banks 
have written credit policies and procedures about the key items 
recommended by the Basel Committee, especially in regard to the structure 
of limits, approval authorities, and price and non-price terms.104) Now, 
financial holding companies and banks of Korea generally have risk 
management committees installed within their board where outside 
directors are given risk management responsibilities. According to a 2008 
research, a majority of Korean financial holding companies had risk 
management committees105) and about 50 percent of risk management 
committee members were made up of outside directors.106) These risk 
management committees are responsible for overseeing all risks, more 
specifically for setting the limits for different types of risks, and distributing 
risky capital for various projects.107)  
Korean banks also have compliance officers who are directly linked to 
corporate governance issues.108) A mandatory compliance officer was 
introduced to financial institutions in Korea including banks, security 
companies, and insurance companies in 2000 in response to the 1997 Crisis. 
Accordingly, a bank is required by Article 23-3 of the Banking Act to 
appoint a compliance officer and establish a compliance program.109) A 
compliance officer is a person that ensures that the company complies with 
outside regulatory requirements and internal policies. If internal control 
standards are violated, the compliance officer is responsible for reporting to 
103) Park, supra note 24, at 216.  
104) Id.  
105) Hwa-Jin Kim, supra note 4, at 162. 
106) Hee-Ju Kang & Joon-Woo Jo, Discussion on Corporate Governance of Banks, lee & Ko 1, 
19 (2012), available at www.leeko.com/publications.
107) Id.  
108) Jeong, supra note 55, at 509. 
109) See Eunhaengbeop [Banking Act], Act No. 10866, Jul. 21. 2011, art. 23-3 (S. Kor.).
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the auditing committee.110) To ensure independence, compliance officers are 
prohibited from engaging in other business activities.111) Furthermore, 
compliance officers have the authority to request that management produce 
or submit information or documents, and are responsible for monitoring 
compliance in order to report to the audit committee or standing auditor.112) 
While Korean banks now have measures against excessive risk-taking, they 
can be improved to prevent future financial crises. 
V. Recommendations
Risk-management procedures, especially effective controls system and 
risk management function, are important.113) And the first step for ensuring 
effective risk-management procedures is ensuring that board risk 
committees are independent and functioning effectively. 
1. Board Expertise & Experience Must Be Improved
The essence of banking is management of risks, and a bank director’s 
duty of risk management must therefore be considered as an essential part 
of his duty of care.114) And compared to directors of general companies, a 
greater duty of risk management must be required of bank directors 
because they generate system risks through multiple contracts signed with 
other financial institutions.115) Despite having a large number of outside 
directors within the risk management committees of Korean banks, the 
committees do not function as effectively as they can. This is because many 
outside directors lack the necessary expertise in banking.116)  
Therefore, there must be greater board expertise regarding risk 
110) Boheomeopbeop [Insurance Business Act], Act No. 6891, May 29. 2003 (S. Kor.).
111) Id.  
112) Id.  
113) Hopt, supra note 11, at 25.
114) Id. at 170.   
115) Kim, supra note 4, at 169.  
116) Kang, supra note 106, at 19.   
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management issues.117) With respect to implementation of risk management 
committees, the global financial crisis showed that the inclusion of board 
members with diverse expertise mattered.118) The report of the Senior 
Supervisor’s Group, prepared by representatives of the Federal Reserve 
Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as several 
regulators from the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, and Germany, 
concluded that certain risk management practices involving board 
expertise differentiated firm performance during the crisis.119)  
Most importantly, firms that fared best were the ones with senior 
management oversight of risk, in the form of a high-level committee, which 
served as a locus for sharing information and understanding the magnitude 
of risks facing the firm.120) Thus, many large foreign banks have made 
efforts to strengthen the board expertise of risk management committees.121) 
For example, in 2009, Citigroup installed a risk management committee 
that is independent of the board of directors, where four out of five 
committee members had substantial expertise and working knowledge and 
experience in the financial industry.122)  
On the other hand, risk management committee members of Korea’s 
four largest banks have insufficient work experience in the financial sector; 
most of the outside directors in the risk management committees only had 
experience as financial researchers or as employees of supervisory 
organizations.123) Therefore, Korean banks need to have management teams 
comprising members with extensive prior experience in capital markets 
and have senior management that “includes people with expertise in a 
range of risks since the source of the next disruption is impossible to 
117) Mulbert, supra note 1, at 22.  
118) Id. at 24.  
119) Id. at 24-25.  
120) See James A. Fanto, The Role of Financial Regulation in Private Financial Firms: Risk 
Management and the Limitations of the Market Model, 3 BrooK. J. of corp., fin. & com. l. 29 
(2008).
121) See-Yeon Lee & Bon-Seong Gu, Proposal for Relieving Corporate Governance Risks of 
Financial Companies, Korea institute of finance 1, 15 (2011), available at http://www.kif.re.kr/
KMFileDir/129610656430808750_KIFPS2011-03.pdf. 
122) Id.  
123) Id.  
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predict.”124)
2. Risk Management Committees Must Meet More Often      
On a related note, risk management committees need to meet more 
often to be effective. For example, in 2009, risk management committees of 
major Korean banks and financial holding companies each held 10 or less 
meetings.125) Meeting less than once a month is not sufficient for a risk 
management committee to effectively fulfill its duties. Foreign banks 
renown for effective risk management such as Banco Santander and BBVA 
have frequent risk management committee meetings. Risk management 
committee of Banco Santander met 100 times in 2006 and 98 times in 2007, 
while that of BBVA met 81 times and 74 times in those respective years.126) 
On the contrary, the now bankrupt Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers each 
held only one or two annual risk management committee meetings. Bear 
Sterns had a risk committee, but it never met.127) Risk management 
committees of Korean banks therefore need to have more frequent meetings 
in order to maximize their efficacy. 
3. There Must Be A More Independent Compliance Officer
The risk management function must be performed in an independent 
manner. In the U.S., this function has been strengthened by having a chief 
risk officer (CRO) who is responsible for all the bank’s principal risks.128) 
And the role of CROs cannot be emphasized enough. As Warren Buffet 
stated in his 2008 letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., his 
belief is “that the CEO of any large financial organization must be the Chief 
Risk Officer as well.”129) Since the business of banks is risk, the CRO must 
hold a powerful role within banks. The CRO role is fulfilled by a compliance 
124) Mulbert, supra note 1, at 25.  
125) Lee, supra note 121, at 21.  
126) Id. at 22.  
127) Id. at 23.  
128) Id. 
129) Aebi, supra note 90. 
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officer in Korea. To live up to these expectations, the compliance officer must 
be substantially independent while having access to the necessary channels 
to perform its duties. This is especially so in Korea where the government 
still maintains a strong voice in selecting top management at banks.  
Compliance officers must have greater independence in order to 
become more effective; they must be closely linked and embedded in the 
bank’s affairs while maintaining independence. Compliance officers must 
to a considerable degree be independent even from the chief executive 
officer (CEO). It has been found that banks in which the CRO reports 
directly to the board of directors perform substantially better in financial 
crises than banks in which the CRO reports to the CEO.130) This is because 
CEO’s main interest is often maximizing growth in sales, assets, and profits, 
which mean that the assessment and treatment of risks might be a lower 
priority. The CEO and compliance officer may thus have conflicting 
interests, and if the compliance officer reports to the CEO, the risk agenda 
may not receive the proper attention.131) 
Therefore, the compliance officer must have access to quick and direct 
information and must have a direct reporting line not only to the CEO or 
CFO, but also to the board or the board risk committee (especially to the 
chairman of the committee).132) This may sufficiently empower the 
compliance officer to serve as a check on the CEO’s potential pursuit for 
short-term profits at the expense of excessive risk-taking. This could be 
further strengthened with special protections against the removal of the 
compliance officer such as requiring majority consent of the board and 
public disclosures in general.133) Non-executive directors should also have 
the right to regular meetings with the compliance officer in the absence of 
senior management.    
4. Special Attention Must Be Paid to CEO Risks
Special attention must be paid to CEO risks that are prevalent in Korean 
130) Id. 
131) Id. 
132) Id.  
133) Hopt, supra note 11, at 26.  
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banks. An important element of corporate governance of banks is the 
selection of CEOs. Since a bank is a corporation, its CEO is chosen by a 
board of directors that is selected by shareholders. To minimize the 
influence of family members of the founder and other political factors, this 
board should be composed mostly of outside directors who are 
independent from bank management. But this is not always the case in 
Korea. Article 22 of the Banking Act and Article 40 of the Financial Holding 
Company Act only specify that half of the board of directors needs to be 
outside directors.134)  Shinhan Financial Group’s internal feud between the 
Chairman Eung-chan Ra and the CEO Sang-hoon Shin is a good example of 
the damaging effects of CEO risks in Korean banks.135) 
CEO risks must be minimized by increasing the number and the role of 
outside directors. Furthermore, supervisory system must be placed to 
oversee whether banks are properly preparing for a succession.136) And 
financial companies should be equipped with a system for CEO selection 
that can be relied upon in case of an emergency.137) It must be the board of 
directors that searches and selects CEOs based on the banks’ long-term 
management strategies, and not the other way around where long-term 
management strategies are based on the newly elected CEOs. 
Lastly, age limits may be a good way to limit CEO risks. Major foreign 
banks such as Citibank in the U.S. and the Royal Bank of Canada already 
have measures restricting the age of their CEOs to 72 years and 70 years, 
respectively. This restriction will prevent situations like that of Shinhan 
where the former chairman of Shinhan Financial, Eung-chan Ra, served at 
the top for nearly two decades.138) 
5. Special Attention Must Be Paid to M&A Risks
Change in ownership structure caused by an M&A leads to changes in 
134) Kim, supra note 4, at 167.  
135) Jae-Kyeong Kim, Shinhan- case of CEO Risk, tHe Korea times (Sep. 15, 2010, 6:44 PM), 
available at www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2011/04/123_73127.html.
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corporate governance and positions, compensation, and welfare levels of 
management and employees. Banks generally seek M&A to achieve 
management synergy through horizontal union, which requires extensive 
structural modifications.139) Here, post-merger integration (PMI) is the most 
difficult task to overcome. M&A between Housing & Commercial Bank and 
Kookmin Bank is a good example.140) Thus, the board of directors must 
consider the fact that banks face the greatest risk during an M&A or 
privatization, and pay special attention to providing efficient corporate 
governance during and after the M&A. Great corporate governance and 
excellent board leadership can create synergy, leading to competitive 
strength. If this condition is not satisfied, banks will be haunted with 
resistance and demands of the bank unions, thereby preventing the 
fulfillment of M&A’s intended purpose.141)  
VI. Conclusion
South Korea’s economy and financial industry have gone through 
incredible growth and maturing in the last fifty years. This rapid growth 
came with side effects, however, and the country’s economy plummeted 
during the 1997 Crisis. Even though there were other factors involved, poor 
corporate governance and risk management played a significant role in 
inducing the crisis. In response, South Korea began a series of financial 
reforms including installation of a corporate governance system for banks. 
These reforms helped the country’s economy to bounce back and for its real 
GDP to continue growing. But as events such as the Shinhan situation and 
financial crises in 2003 and 2008 indicate, there is still much room for 
improving corporate governance of banks. 
Corporate governance reforms with a focus on better risk management 
can address these problems and help the Korean banking industry to 
mature. There are several risk management functions installed in the 
Korean financial industry that satisfy the Basel recommendations. 
139) Kim, supra note 4, at 168.   
140) Id.   
141) Id.   
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Although this seems to illustrate a strong risk management system, there 
are still problems that need to be solved. This paper focuses on greater 
board expertise, more frequent risk management committee meetings, a 
more independent compliance officer, and better addressing of CEO risks 
and M&A risks, in order to improve the risk management system of Korean 
banks. These recommendations can help prevent financial crises in the 
future. 
***
***
